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**EVERYTHING, EVERYWHERE: THE EFFACEMENT
OF THE SCENE OF THE EVERYDAY**
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"Everyday life" is a distinctive ideology that prominently serves Euroamerican social thought at certain historic moments in its development, and now is one of those moments. Everyday life is a referent of discourse about culture and society that works like a chronotope in the development of the novel, as described by Bakhtin: it defines the ground which makes the attribution of certain sentiments and cognitions to human agents possible. What these might be in discourse about society and culture, particularly now, I will conjecture in a moment.

But to otherwise take everyday life as a literal object of description and analysis, in the hope for a rigorous empiricism about historic and ethnographic states of society and culture, or as the base of any kind of realism or naturalism in academic writing, is perhaps a necessary and appealing, but certainly naive and simplistic endeavor, from which I want to distance myself. To grasp innocently, or in the name of virtue, the dynamics of the everyday has long been a preoccupation of certain varieties of twentieth century social thought and philosophy that has proved ultimately either intractable or else uninteresting to the concerns of historians and ethnographers for whom descriptive richness and specificity of detail in micro-focussed time-spaces have so far been essential in conceiving the everyday.

Michel de Certeau (1984) has provided perhaps the most astute critique of the scene of the everyday in the work of two seminal theorists--Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault-- for whom this construct is foundational. This is a critique to which Certeau himself falls prey in his own attempt to grasp a particular sort of everyday life practice--an attempt to which I will return. Certeau effectively argues the intractability of everyday life to the kind and level of description and narrative in which social scientists and historians are interested. As he metaphorically says of the inability of the discursive to capture the non-discursive in social life, which the everyday definitionally is (1984: 62):

A particular problem arises when, instead of being a discourse on other discourses, as is usually the case, theory has to advance over an area where there are no longer any discourses. There is a sudden unevenness of terrain; the ground on which verbal language rests begins to fall. The theorizing operation finds itself at the limits of the terrain where it normally functions, like an automobile at the edge of a cliff. Beyond and below lies the ocean.

Thus, social discourse on the everyday in focussing on events, conflicts, underlying, hovering, or embodied rules of practice such as *habitus*--that is, in making very much not taken-for-granted positive statements--always displaces the definitional unsayable, or at least unwritable quality of the everyday in its just out-of-consciousness, taken-for-granted character. Theoretically, the everyday has in recent times been brilliantly and satisfyingly

conceptualized. But as guides for coming up with descriptions of the everyday after the historian's or ethnographer's immersions into experiences of "social facts", such conceptualizations are deeply problematic.

The dynamics of everyday life have been complexly investigated by twentieth century philosophies of being, language, and phenomenology. The problem is that it has been difficult to clothe these systems of thought in the specificities of social and cultural processes of interest to historical and ethnographic scholarship. So, while Husserl, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, among others, have been influential among social theorists and often inspirational to those who pursue specific research on "the daily life of x or y" they do not serve the latter in any operational way at the level at which they wish to refer to and describe the quotidian.

This returns us to everyday life, if not as mimesis, then as a chronotope, a prominent ideological construct of academic writing about the social. As this, it has been the ground in academic writing about modernity for evoking three related sets of values-cognitions in relation to society and culture constituted as an object of discourse. Each of these has tended to constitute the everyday as a scene or space of virtue, of essence, and of meaningfulness against matters social and cultural in modern life that seem ominously beyond human scale or comprehension:

(1) The everyday is the scene where order in social and cultural life is universally guaranteed and can be most intimately understood in any society. This order is also the achievement of morality constantly being negotiated. The moral order is the eight, for example, that the everyday has carried most explicitly in the distinctive sociological project of Erving Goffman, but also in the cult of ethnomethodology, in socio-linguistics and the ethnography of communication, in the game theory of economists, in symbolic interactionism, in phenomenological perspectives that posit the social construction of reality and the self, and in linguistically achieved intersubjectivity as the foundation of rationality in Habermas' critical theory.

(2) The everyday is the scene where the continuing creativity of human is demonstrated against all odds. This expressive function of the here and now chronotope of the quotidian has had many ideological loadings, especially within Marxist thought, but generally it has been the ground for probing resistance and contestation, and the idea of constrained, compromised opposition to dominant, official, and hegemonic formations which are continuous with the everyday, but crucially do not subsume it completely. For example, this is the primary weight that the everyday carries in the work of British, and now American, critical cultural studies, focussing on the receptions to popular culture and media, in the work of those studying colonial and post-colonial situations and transformations of world cultures, including much ethnography produced by anthropologists and other scholars about "weapons of the weak", and in the work influenced by the writing of Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, and Anthony Giddens, on the practices of everyday life in larger social and economic orders, for which Michel de Certeau's book of the same name is both a brilliant critique and exemplar.

(3) The everyday is the scene where the most real dimensions of real life occur, and where relief from abstraction, not only of social theory and analysis, but of the complex formal systems and institutions which govern contemporary life, becomes possible. The sense that a focus on the everyday produces access to knowledge about real persons and lived experience is one of the primary effects that anthropological ethnography has frequently cultivated and is a major standard on which professional judgments about it are made. This

value upon the everyday chronotope is also part of the general humanism that pervades the other two ideological weightings of the everyday just discussed.

These three longstanding discursive functions of the everyday--as a site of moral order, resistance, and the experientially real and mundane--come together most saliently and cogently at the moment in the field of discourse generated by the cultural studies movement in the United States, for which the chronotope of the everyday is an emblematic feature of position, political commitment, and style of knowledge. This movement is motivated by an ideological willingness, if not eagerness, to blur disciplinary boundaries among many humanistic and human science fields, is in fact powered by European theories of language, culture, and modernity coming at first through the disciplinary channel of literary studies, and is institutionalized in the dozens of humanities or cultural studies centers that have appeared in many universities over the past several years.

It is primarily inspired by the now mythic British cultural studies that had its most vital period in the first three decades that followed World War II. Primarily a confluence between literature and history, with a heavy western Marxist influence, and concurrent with the trend of social history (which for a much longer period has exerted an influence on American historians), British cultural studies had as one of its key aims opposition to the generic idea of culture as high or elite culture. It substituted for this notion instead the idea of subcultures, and cultures with a small "c" as forms of life generally in the sense that it had long had for anthropologists specializing in colonized peoples, but blindly and ahistorically seen as autonomous, and for a long time, as primitive. This was the case for American, not British, anthropologist for whom culture was much less important than the social as a key term. Regardless, the blindness and fixity with which anthropology has colonized its colonized subjects has sadly made it irrelevant to the development of cultural studies.

"Culture is ordinary" became one of the powerfully focussing slogans of British cultural studies, and with it, a focus on the scene of the everyday and commonplace as the object of cultural analysis. The provocation was to equate the culture of that considered "low" to that of the authoritative elite and in so doing to legitimate the attribution of culture to working classes and minorities of all kinds, as well as to legitimate the study of popular culture. This thrust has recently been reproduced in the United States, but with the existing intellectual environment here being already more open to the primary understanding of culture as ordinary and referring to the quotidian. Still, the renewed and concentrated emphasis on the everyday, on worlds beyond past disciplinary canons, orthodoxies, and boundaries has spoken to a particular predicament of left-liberal intellectuals and academics since the 1960s. The values and claims about modernity that were at the heart of once more credible and radical political theories and visions, especially associated with varieties of Marxism from the 1920s up through the 1960s, now attenuated and domesticated, have been rather more impotently reconfigured in cultural studies as the kinds of knowledge worth producing and the stakes involved. In this, the ideological attraction of the scene of the everyday to left-liberal positions in the academy has been paramount.

The problem, however, is that the particular configuration of the everyday that is being used for such present purposes may be seriously flawed, may be more a nostalgic fantasy than a more or less accurate referent to reality on which the integrity of this chronotope depends. Following the British, the provocative and critical focus in American

cultural studies on the everyday remains oriented against the tyranny of high culture, elitist knowledge. Indeed, the virtue of the everyday as the here and now, with its qualities of order, morality, creative human agency, and an access to lived experience continues in this orientation to be a crucial component of critical knowledge that grounds the opening of suppressed perspectives and voices. Yet, at the very same time, this construction of the everyday depends, as I will argue, on parameters that seem to block, to finesse at best, the complexities of factors and experiences that would define an alternative chronotope for the everyday that would make it relevant to discussions sustained with almost willful irresolution about the conditions of postmodernity. The scene of the everyday that has so far reigned in cultural studies may be weakened or undermined if it does not encompass, or at least refer to, the complexity of postmodern realities, a contest of debate and competition among representations that is far more cogent than the old struggle against high culture hegemony, imagined iron cages, and the like. The ideological construct of the scene of the everyday itself must be redesigned on the basis of its ability to be satisfyingly evoked (not adequately represented--a key distinction of operation) in the so-called crisis of representation or description of society and culture that the debates about postmodernity have been most substantively about.

The study of culture in anthropology, which has been, as I noted, outside and irrelevant to the cultural studies project, has always taken culture primarily as the ordinary and quotidian. Nonetheless, the uses and critique of this construction of culture as ordinary within anthropology can be an object lesson for its foundational and inspirational uses in cultural studies. More forcefully and more directly than in any other discipline, anthropology has recently focussed critiques of the way that it has constituted the here and now, everyday space-time of the cultures it has described through a renewed awareness not only of the historic contexts in which anthropological representations and subjects have always operated, but also that these contexts might also be undergoing unprecedented changes which might require more than just a "correction" by way of historicizing, etc. of older modes of evoking and constituting the everyday and ordinary in ethnography. This is the provocation posed by the controversial plea for the need of experimentation in ethnographic description brought on by the combined influence of postmodern theories about the nature of language, discourse, and subjectivity, and of the positing of powerful conditions of social change under the same banner.

Before pursuing the effect upon the chronotope of the everyday of a posited crisis of representation, it might be noticed that I have shifted a bit in my initial argument to say that while there is no pure mimetic representational possibility of the everyday, how the effect of the everyday is produced in the reception of discourse, nonetheless, very much has to do with the effort of representing the quotidian as real. The point is that it is not simply a task of analytically describing the everyday, which I argued has proven intractable to historians and ethnographers. Rather there is a complex relation between what sorts of representations historians and ethnographers do choose to produce and the sense or effect of the everyday this produces in reception. There is an additional important object lesson for the cultural studies interest in the everyday in how the valorization of the everyday has been sustained in the writing and reception of anthropological ethnography.

I have noted that a sense of real people, of everyday life existence, is what anthropologists have always wanted out of the ethnographies that they read, and certainly this is one of the main standards for judging their quality, despite the fact that ethnographies rarely have literally tried to describe everyday life, say, in the manner of a

Dickens novel (this kind of literary realism in ethnography is quite recent or else has been off-beat when it has occurred). This suggests that certain kinds of representations, constructions of objects for description and analysis, are not literally efforts to represent the everyday. Rather their effectiveness in this regard depends on their capacity to evoke the everyday, to satisfy the desire for it, in the imaginations of their readers. There is nothing mysterious about this. The essence of discipline in academia, especially as related to genres of academic writing, is learning to see/hear certain kinds of objects of discourse in reception. So much is given about process that in the kind of Verstehen analytical reasoning that anthropologists often do with ethnographic materials, various scenarios can be evoked. This is what is meant by the notion that an ethnography gives a sense of the everyday without actually attempting the kind of narrative mimesis in literary realism.

The more general point, then, that I want to draw from this argument is that the effect of the everyday is produced not by mimesis, but by a more complex process of evocation, based on representations that appeal to the imagination of readers who are able to think through material in this way. The interesting and more complex question, then, is what sorts of representations at different times most effectively satisfy this desire for knowing the everyday. What representations best evoke the everyday now? This becomes a key question for the rest of my argument about reconfiguring the chronotope of the everyday in the midst of the postmodern, where delimited time-space, here-and-now, actions in place as symbolic or essential sites of the everyday-- the home, the work place, the street etc-- are increasingly regarded as very partial stories, the particularity of which is an unsatisfying block to the here-and-there simultaneity of the postmodern everyday.

To actually claim to focus on the ordinary, to capture it situationally, inhibits, as I have argued, this more complex imagining of the everyday in reaction to representations that are produced as the fruits of "research". Especially in the present intellectual atmosphere, experiments are called for which constitute objects both more global and local, and consider how the prevailing mode for describing the everyday might fit into such reconfigured space-time. This leads us to the claim that the "culture is ordinary", "here and now" evocation of the scene of the everyday is no longer in many discourses adequate or satisfying in evoking a sense of lived experience or ordinary life.

A much sloganized crisis of representation in the postmodern debate of academia finds its substance in the registering of difficulties in the pragmatic, problem-solving discourses of law, medicine, business, and diplomacy in representing to themselves social realities that touch deep assumptions of how they construe the scene of the everyday. There is something limited or inadequate about telling the story of social problems in terms of ordinary life in community and its fate under the pressure of increasingly penetrating world systems. These systems are always already part of everyday lives, and problems that come to courts, for instance, can no longer be subsumed under any easy delineation of so-called "facts of the case" that are confined to an easily representable or assumable scene of the everyday.

For example, I recently studied the legal administration of mass toxic tort cases, such as Agent Orange and Bhopal, with an interest in seeing how conventional legal frameworks of discourse and practice were being affected by cases that could not be reduced to the commonplace, everyday scene of action on which the narration and resolution of torts has depended through the age of industrialization and high capitalism. These mass toxic tort cases are both unmanageable and unrepresentable, and the skill of judicial administration is in (not uncontroversially) how to finesse solutions. Along the way

there are discussions and debates about how to reconcile the global complexity of such cases and doing justice to masses of individuals in their everyday life situations. The problem, of course, is that the two, the global and local, are not opposed processually (except by binarism, and conceptual fiat), but are a complex, not particularly systematic totality, and the appearance of these cases constantly reminds judges, lawyers, plaintiffs, and defendants of this. Legal discourse moving shakily toward resolutions of such cases is at least one place to look for the emergence of reconfigurations of the everyday within so-called expert systems.

What then is the core process in postmodernity that seems to be effacing the everyday, in the sense of it as the commonsensical deeply assumed chronotope for evoking left-liberal visions of reality? This core process is nicely captured by the geographer David Harvey in his clarifying, but critical book The Condition of Postmodernity (1989), as the effects of time-space compression in everyday experience, produced by radical changes of technologies of transport and communication during the past twenty years and the reshaping of the operations of governments, business and most other institutions as a result. "Everywhere everything", or "here and there", rather than "here and now" is the more appropriate slogan for the quality of everyday life. But what sorts of objects of description for historians and ethnographers capture this? And what prevents a return to formal systems analysis, abstraction, and the eschewing of the vital desire for those ideological objects and functions that the everyday has thus far provided in social thought? Harvey, as a Marxist critic, has taken on the postmodern, particularly its mystique of millennial shift or change, in order to deflate it, by getting to his notion of the heart of the matter--which is the effect upon society and culture of time-space compression--and showing that what is at stake can be understood under classic frames of reference; that this is nothing to be that excited about--let's not forget Marx and history. Time-space compression I do think is a fair designation of the key process to focus on in considering why the chronotope of the everyday and the descriptive means in the past for evoking it are problematic, but I depart from Harvey in his confidence that these changes can be accommodated by existing theory that does not require the radical breaks, imagined by postmodern thinking, which he considers as excess, bordering on the nihilistic and irrational.

What is at stake in Harvey's critique of postmodernism is a strong desire for storytelling, narration, and implicitly the values-cognitions powerfully grounded in the chronotope of the everyday implicated in storytelling, academic and otherwise--yet, with an acknowledgement of the power and usefulness of certain dimensions of postmodern thinking: for example, emphasis on reflexivity, the complex ways global and local knowledges are situated and related. The conservative position is not to imagine that storytelling can occur in any other way: a place is sought for the critiques that will not disrupt past narratives, for fear that the only alternative is politically amorphous (and therefore dangerous) nihilism and hermetic textualism. The alternative position is one that sees the postmodern debates themselves as containing valuable means of returning to storytelling, in the sense of more convincing, persuasive, and open-ended communications between writer/speaker and reader/audience that satisfy the desire for the evocation of real life. The nub of course is whether one thinks present realities require new narratives, that may have to deal with fragmentation but that are not necessarily avant garde experiments in this sense, that are communicable to large numbers of people, or not. In the end the difference may be quite academic, and not have much consequence as to the sort of work that is produced within disciplinary mainstreams. But I do think this is a difference that

would make a difference--the current situation of ethnography/anthropological writing is one important testing ground.

To be more specific, there are at least five important strategies for constructing critical cultural analyses flowing from the proposition of time-space compression, the "everywhere everythingness" of contemporary social and culture conditions that pervades everyday life and its study, and that most provocatively pushes for changes in the way the chronotope of the everyday is configured traditionally in social discourse (as in the ordinary culture against high culture interest of cultural studies).

(1) The emphasis on reflexivity in cultural critique and the notion that part of the positioning of any observer toward an observed must take account of the always already relationship that exists between the two. This means that the distance between the observer and observed is closed by the foregrounded practice of reflexivity and as such, the scene of the everyday of the subject or observed loses its referential boundedness. The reflexive closing of the distance between the observer and observed is one kind of globalizing or opening up of the local, and conflicts with the taken-for-grantedness which defines the everyday. Reflexivity is momentous, not quotidian, and therefore seems to compress time-space in a way that unites observer and observed and displaces the dimensions in terms of which the everyday is conventionally thought.

(2) The compression of time-space increases the role of the imaginary and the fantastic in any social situation--people literally live in their heads in a much broader and more diverse frame than they might have been supposed to have done before. The study of imagination is no longer tied primarily or only to place, the confines of a particular site on which the evocation of the everyday has depended. Coordinates of experience become much more fragmented in their imagination underlain by the availability of many more objects and life styles to think with. The imagination, except for a very constrained sense of it, was perhaps outside the confines of the everyday in the past, even contrasted with it; the provocation now is that it must be fully incorporated into what evokes everyday life anywhere.

(3) Related to two, the critical analysis of social and cultural situations incorporates the study of possibility, submerged or emergent--the everyday is often constrained by the mundane, what is, not what ought to or could be. Breaking the bounds of the integrally local, part of the old scene of the everyday as chronotope, moves the study of cultural critique into the speculative in a grounded way that escapes the conventional construct of the everyday, but not if the everyday is reconfigured within, among, or as part of the strategies of representation suggested here.

(4) A common object of the study of contemporary cultural process is the study of representations which cross-cut, travel across a diversity of social situations in their production and reception. Such study is a way of getting a handle on the fear of fragmentation, patternless juxtapositions that the specter of the postmodern throws up. The point is that the study of representations involves the social life of things as well as people, and seems outside the frame of the everyday, except as the study of their consumption or reception in particular sites. This is one sort of access to the study of representations, that is consistent with the old chronotope of the everyday, but it is a very partial study of representations which are nomadic. Where, then, is the everyday, the quotidian, and the weight of order, lived experience, and human agency and creativity in this domain of representations?

(5) Related to four, if the identity of any group is a disseminated process occurring at many sites in the frame of many different activities, and if this process is not essentialized, as it is

in the everyday scene of authentic whole human agency against a system of formality and abstraction, but is at many points and in many places a story of connected agencies in simultaneity, then where does the everyday rest, or how is it to be evoked? There is no doubt that something like life as it is lived multiply across contexts must be the frame of representation that would overcome contemporary suspicions that the everyday can't be only the traditional chronotope of delimited time-space. But what sort of technique of representing this fragmented, disseminated process would now most effectively evoke, not system or scheme, which is the danger, but the everyday in the imaginations of readers based on this refigured chronotope whose dimensions expand as a result of the key process of time-space compression that Harvey explains? Any cultural situation or scene of the everyday, then, is always multiply constructed across space, and is never wholly localized; the challenge to give a contemporary sense of the everyday is to show the simultaneity of situations and identity of circumstances worlds apart. This is the lived sense of fragmentation that is constitutive of everyday life--that gives it agency, order, morality, and possibility.

There have been several times in Western intellectual history when something similar to a postmodern moment has challenged the bounds of the then going sense of mundane realism and representation about the contemporary world, that also upset the notion of the sufficiency of a simple everyday focus on the micro here and now social setting. During the 1930s particularly, and especially within the frame of leftist and Marxist visions of society, infused with a sense of momentous political change, a number of distinct documentary experiments were undertaken which tried to preserve and enhance the idea of the everyday within an attempt to give a sense of the totality of mass societies. And what's more, they attacked what Clifford, Said, and others have challenged as the authority of the social scientist--e.g., the ethnographer, the orientalist, the documentarian to represent others. In most cases, these experiments involved the mobilization of differently situated members of a population to produce auto-documentary or ethnography. However, In the US, under the WPA, this experiment took the form of guide books by unemployed writers fanning out across the land to discover the pluralism of America at the level of the everyday--to discover literally what was there that had never been recorded so systematically before. This was posed as a literary, realist alternative to polling and social surveying, which were parallel emergent efforts at the heart of legitimating social science. In England, there was Mass Observation, an attempt to survey the society at the level of the everyday, by having hundreds of people on a particular day record their surrounding. These were then collated in single volume (see May 12, 1937 Mass-Observation Day Survey by over two hundred observers).

Dozens of other such studies were conducted in specific sites and institutions. In 1934, at the first Congress of Soviet Writers, Maxim Gorky proposed his "One Day in the World" idea--this is the same conference in which he coined the term socialist realism, which was to have an infamous transformation under Stalin. He recommended choosing a day at random, rather than selecting a day commemorating the founding of a nation, an armistice between nation, or any other occasion officially or customarily deemed historic. He suggested that any would do, but the one selected was September 27, 1935, and interesting work was generated from a collection of snapshot writings from around the world. Paralleling this effort was a similar one in China, "One Day in China" undertaken in March 1936, which gave rise to a new genre of collectively written reportage--"One Day in

Shanghai" (1938), "One Day in Central Hebei" (1940), and "One Day in Anpoing" (1941) followed.

These, then, were predecessors to the current postmodern predicament of realism that certainly combined the desire for merging the global and local at the level of the everyday chronotope. The results were naive, but interesting. This genre continues even today, but in terms of a kind of capitalist realism, as promotions for certain societies and nationalisms that could as easily originate in advertizing and public relations. They eventuate in glossy, beautiful PBS travelogs, or coffeetable editions such as One Day in Australia, One Day in Hawaii, One Day in the US, produced not as a collective effort of autoethnography by the populations concerned, but by the fanning out in cooperative-competitive effort of photographers of great reputation (still I have seen some of these books that have had remarkable critical potential--for example, one showing the diversity of life situations of contemporary Australian aborigines, and another showing the diversity of international life situations of contemporary Samoans--both of these books counter the classic anthropological and popular representations of each of these people).

These "one day in the life" documentaries do pose the problem that I have been trying to lay out in this paper. Most importantly, they develop the sense in which all social phenomena are nomadic, travelled. The old localized scene of the everyday survives as the afterthought of the reader--it is evocative, but what does the evoking is no simple mimesis of everyday life situations, but something on a much broader and complex canvas. To evoke the everyday, however delimited, from representations much more expansive is the contemporary challenge.

Looking back to an earlier moment of modernism, the cinematic experiments of Russian documentary filmmakers are probably more relevant as an inspiration for the kind of representational strategies I am exploring than the "day in the life" projects. The work of Dziga Vertov, for example, and especially his silent film Man With a Camera evokes for me a powerful sense of everyday life at a particular historic moment, represented on a social scale, pieced together through a strategy of juxtaposition and editing that conveys the simultaneity of fragments of activity. The kino-eye project as cells of filmmakers among the people is not unlike the collectivist projects of Mass Observation, Gorky's One Day in the World, and the Chinese One Day in the Life of China. But it was the work of Vertov himself that showed how documentary representation could be created that showed simultaneous life situations at the level of the everyday. The translation of such montage techniques and strategies of juxtapositions to writing is something on which I have been working in my own projects, to which I now want to turn briefly.

Prospects for the Return of a Reconfigured Everyday Life.

At this point of addressing the provocation to explore alternative representations for evoking a complex but just as realist sense of the everyday, I want to do so with reference to the history of my own recent research which has led, as a shifting focussed object of description, from a concern specifically with dynastic families to their legacies in the formation of public cultural institutions. It is important to return to Certeau's Practrice of Everyday Life to confront certain ironies in his work with regard to my own specific research.

Certeau states the purpose of his work in this way (1984: xiv-xv):

to bring to light the clandestine forms taken by the dispersed, tactical and

makeshift creating of groups or individuals, already caught in the nets of "discipline". Pushed to their ideal limits these procedures and ruses of consumers compose the network of an antidiscipline which is the subject of this book.

As I noted, Certeau does powerfully make the everyday his object in this book despite his critique of its objectification in the writings of Bourdieu and Foucault. Certainly, he means for it to serve as the scene in which he can portray certain important processes of resistance and domination in social life. But how generic a concept is everyday life, or even the idea of practice when worked in this way, or are they tailored only in terms of a specific interest?

Certeau's book turns on the distinction between strategy and tactics. Strategy is the domain of the powerful, of discipline, of the panoptic and controlling; it (and the "it" is conceived in human, machinelike terms) has place; tactics are the weapon of the weak, those (and he very much views the agents of tactics in human terms) who have no place use time primarily as a weapon, which amounts to subtle acts of resistance embedded within dominating places of strategy and discipline. Tactics are the activity of working classes and marginals of all kinds submitted to various disciplines of modern regimes of work, leisure, and culture industries. For instance, one key form is "la perruque" or the subtle, deceptive use of the work process for one's own purposes, a sort of quiet revenge on the bosses.

From the point of view of one who has spent much time working on the empowered or powerful, in my case the patrimonial wealthy, but also including ethnographic studies of scientists and intellectuals, Certeau's exclusions in his seemingly generic discussion of everyday life seem odd and problematic. Do only those who exercise tactics experience, or can be described, within the frame of everyday life? Or can the elites such as I have mentioned only be considered to have everyday life when they are positioned in the frame of the dominated by some faceless discipline of money, institutional process, bureaucracy, or tyranny of method? As Certeau says at one point (:xvii), "Marginality is becoming universal. A marginal group has now become a silent majority". I suppose then, for example, that even the affluent, the educated, the privileged are victimized as petit bourgeois middle-brow consumers.

But what about the rich, intellectuals, scientists, rulers etc. in the contexts where they are clearly powerful and feel empowered, when they are wielding strategies, and define and are mutually defined by places or spaces that they control, when they are not particularly in the vice of some larger faceless strategy of discipline? Do these persons share the chronotope of everyday life, do they come within its ideological loadings? Clearly they don't, and they are excluded from Certeau's practices of everyday life. On the one hand, this is very much a limitation of Certeau's idea of the everyday, in the genre of "culture is ordinary"--as noted, itself a powerful construct in opposition to the tyranny of high culture, but also a blind-sided slogan within the context of postmodern conditions.

On the other hand, there is something very just in Certeau's exclusion of those who personify and humanize the exercise of strategy, in that their everyday cannot be accommodated in the "culture is ordinary", here and now frame common to cultural studies constructions of the everyday. Rather the everyday of intellectuals, scientists, and the rich must be accommodated within the multiple agency, imaginary postmodern strategies of representing the real that challenge the here and now scene of the everyday (it is not of course, that the dominated, the victimized, and the marginal exercising tactics could not also be treated in the same way, and to do so would probably show the complex connections between specific groups of empowered and powerless in contemporary society

that are usually elided in works such as those of Certeau which humanize tactics and dehumanize strategy). The point is that the field of "strategy" as Certeau defines the domain of power cannot embed the everyday for the empowered in the same way that one constructs the tactical scene of the everyday for the relatively powerless. Thus, it makes the former, ideal subjects for rethinking and reconfiguring the representations that most effectively evoke the sense of the everyday and lived experience in readers of ethnography.

Probably the most impressive experiments in evoking the everyday through strategies of nomadic representation and shifting agency are those that try to grasp the practices and identities that constitute objects such as science and scientists, knowledge and intellectuals, money and the wealthy. So far, the most impressive achievements are in the ethnography and social study of science, especially the recent works by Bruno Latour (1989), Donna Haraway (1990), and Sharon Traweek (1989), among others. The peripatetic quality of these works rests in constantly shifting gaze, and objects of attention in order to define a complex subject--a discipline, a process of discovery, a form of life, that takes the qualities of things and animals as seriously as persons. I think these works show what sorts of representation are necessary to come away with a sense of the dimensions of the quotidian for those in the grip of science, universities, or money.

Regarding my own research on families and fortunes, I started out being interested in families and found that I was really probing fortunes, which not only subsumed families but also other kinds of institutions related to the state, economy, and culture. Or as in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes "the millioncracy, considered in a large way, is not at all an affair of persons and families, but a perpetual fact of money with a variable human element" (1859: 15-16). Now in the great nineteenth century realist novels concerned with dynastic families, as those of Henry James, the effort was indeed to focus upon the everyday affairs of such groups, to reveal them by showing what went on within the four walls, the places they inhabited--in the traditional scenes of the everyday. Within these scenes money itself was symbolically represented, and the subterranean processes that produce wealth condensed in such symbols--so that is in The Golden Bowl, and in The Spoils of Poynton, there is the focus upon the house and possessions. But in my work, for defining the complex object involved in the relation of families to their wealth, no such symbolic device and no such retention of the scene of the here and now everyday could be retained. Rather the mutual multiple site construction of the identities, practices, and habits of wealth, the persons adhering to it as owners, and the kinds of institutions which it engenders and engender it required a much more complex scale of representation. Yet, in so doing, and in commitment to the ethnographic tradition, I felt I had to avoid reverting to modelling, reductionist systems analysis, or to the attribution of strategy as opposed to tactics, the inhumanity of discipline to the humanness of resistance, in Certeau's terms. Instead, what was required was to create representation that would evoke the everydayness of complex objects.

In attempting this, I have thus far found two sorts of representations that have combined an ability to evoke powerfully everyday life of human subjects, while still dealing with the consequences of time-space compression for establishing fragmented contexts of social action, full of unexpected connections and requiring the juxtaposition of often contrasting sites of activity worlds apart.

(1) Through the great specificity and particularity of life history, which is the sort of data most common in working among dynastic families. Such memory narratives powerfully evoke the everyday life of the rich, and are read for it, classically in the popular memoir

genre about the rich or being upper-class. The problem with standard attempts at making the everyday an object and defining its pragmatics is that it generalizes--in x society, or rich subculture, daily life is like this for typical subjects. But the widespread belief is that life is singular for the rich. Thus, projecting common experience is powerfully evoked by "reading" the in depth testimony of an exemplary life history. This kind of reading for the general character of daily life from the single life is less suspect than when one deduces from a common life a more common everyday. This has a lot to do with being accustomed to limited access to the rich, elite, as well as connecting advantage, and privilege with specificity, peculiarity, and eccentricity.

(2) Oppositely, through the globalization of phenomena in the fragmented world of nomadic references and agencies that compose the lives of the wealthy and connect them to things they don't intend--this again is the "perpetual fact of money with a variable human element" which finally becomes the object of the study of the rich--a disseminated and diverse subject, with a certain accumulation of wealth having several complexly changing and constructed human manifestations. The everyday life of a fortune must encompass this posited totality which becomes the object of description and analysis. The ideas of the everyday must be mapped onto this unwieldy unnamable object, rather than be a limited perspective on it, e.g. what goes on within the four walls, "here and now" lives of the rich, with their pure monied sides left, in Certeau's case as strategy and therefore cut off from everyday life, when in fact this seamless nomadic world of construction and meaning, the processes that humanize money, are an essential aspect of the everyday and its pragmatics.

The most cogent of evoking the everyday of the rich for readers is not, then, the "here and now" of confined time-space of the domicile, or the office, or the club, but the disseminating multiple constructions of human subjects and institutions that diversely emerge around and in connection with a fortune, which is so composed. Access to this is through the very specific reflective narrative of autobiography among those intimately connected and defined by an accumulation of wealth--its heirs, caretakers and beneficiares--or through the opposite globalizing attempt to define the beast in its fragmented totality. Either way what emerges is a more realistic sense, given late twentieth century realities and sensibilities, of real people and the everyday in complex dimensions beyond its old powerful chronotope of the "here and now", of struggle, order, and morality within a small sacred phenomenological space of coherent being. This chronotope has been exploded by time-space compression, in Harvey's terms, and it must now be evoked by changes in representation that reflect these momentous changes in the quality and scope of life within the worlds of strategy and tactics alike.

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